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Re: [TLS] Babel-HMAC [was: are we holding TLS wrong?]

Juliusz Chroboczek <jch@irif.fr> Wed, 14 November 2018 10:49 UTC

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Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2018 11:49:39 +0100
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From: Juliusz Chroboczek <jch@irif.fr>
To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Babel-HMAC [was: are we holding TLS wrong?]
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>> Unless I've missed something -- they are not, assuming you have
>> a sufficiently strong random number generator.  The challenge mechanism
>> rebuilds the shared state in a secure manner, and the index mechanism
>> ensures that an (index, seqno) pair is never reused.

> I had a really hard time understanding this, even with this help.
> Right now, I don't know what key is used for HMAC.  I think that the
> expectation is that each peer has a fixed HMAC key, but the contents
> of the packet always change, thereby ensuring that the resulting MAC
> is different for every packet.

That's the general idea, yes.  I'm not a cryptographer myself, and I don't
know how original this is.

> I would suggest that a formal analysis would be a good idea.

Yes, we're hoping to do that.  If you could point us to examples of papers
that contain a proof of correctness of a cryptographic protocol that you
believe is well done, that'd be helpful.

-- Juliusz

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