[TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC9846 (9161)
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Subject: [TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC9846 (9161)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC9846, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3" -------------------------------------- You may review the report below and at: https://errata.rfc-editor.org/eid9161/ -------------------------------------- Type: Technical Reported by: Antun Jurkovikj <antunjurkovic@gmail.com> Section 1.2 says: Original Text ------------- Correct the lower bound on CertificateRequest.extensions to be 0 bytes. This was an error in the syntax as it is possible to send no extensions, which results in length 0. Corrected Text -------------- Correct the lower bound on CertificateRequest.extensions to be 0 bytes. This corrects the presentation syntax to represent an empty vector; Section 4.4.2 nevertheless requires the "signature_algorithms" extension in a conforming CertificateRequest. Notes ----- The presentation-language bound and the message-specific sender requirement address different layers. Extension extensions<0..2^16-1> makes a zero-length vector syntactically representable. However, Section 4.4.2 requires the "signature_algorithms" extension in every conforming CertificateRequest under the base specification. The existing Section 1.2 sentence conflates syntactic representability with permitted sender behavior. The corrected text changes no wire rule or sender requirement. Instructions: ------------- This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". Please use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party will log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. -------------------------------------- RFC9846 (draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis) -------------------------------------- Title : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 Publication Date : July 2026 Author(s) : E. Rescorla Category : Proposed Standard Source : tls (sec) Stream : IETF Verifying Party : IESG