Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3

Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> Mon, 07 March 2016 17:44 UTC

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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2016 08:39:58 -0800
Message-ID: <CAHOTMVKMPuaakquEz=s7pRDGEHpXT9qsRVkNMv_kaz5Zx31skQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: "Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)" <sfluhrer@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3
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On Mon, Mar 7, 2016 at 8:34 AM, Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) <sfluhrer@cisco.com
> wrote:

> Defenses against the first type of attack (passive evesdropping by someone
> who will build a QC sometime in the future) are something that this WG
> should address; even if the PKI people don't have an answer, we would at
> least be secure from someone recording the traffic and decrypting it later


I think it would make sense to wait for the CFRG to weigh in on
post-quantum crypto. Moving to a poorly studied post-quantum key exchange
algorithm exclusively runs the risk that when it does receive wider
scrutiny new attacks will be found. I think we need to define hybrid
pre/post-quantum key exchange algorithms (e.g. ECC+Ring-LWE+HKDF), and that
sounds like work better suited for the CFRG than the TLS WG.

-- 
Tony Arcieri