Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically better for TLS 1.3
Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org> Fri, 01 November 2013 19:09 UTC
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Date: Fri, 01 Nov 2013 20:09:39 +0100
From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
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To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically better for TLS 1.3
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On 11/01/2013 12:09 AM, Nico Williams wrote: > > My list: > > - It should be deployable, that's first; in particular, it needs to be > deployable with ECDH PFS key exchanges. (unrelated) It would actually be nice to have a wiki for anyone to add his wish list there. > - Renegotiation should be replaced with an NPN-like extension that > provides privacy to the TLS client principal name. I don't think anyone can avoid renegotiation. Since the TLS packet counters are 64-bit (and more importantly in DTLS 48-bits), one cannot avoid renegotiation to reset the counters. (nevertheless, all the practical VPNs I've seen using TLS, don't use renegotiation, they just re-establish the session). regards, Nikos
- [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically bette… Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Dan Harkins
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Robert Ransom
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Robert Ransom
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Robert Ransom
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Dan Harkins
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Robert Ransom
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Dan Harkins
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Robert Ransom
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Robert Ransom
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Dan Harkins
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Robert Ransom
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Watson Ladd
- [TLS] removal of nonces [was: What would make TLS… Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] removal of nonces [was: What would make… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Robert Ransom
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Ralf Skyper Kaiser
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Ralf Skyper Kaiser
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Robert Ransom
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Ralf Skyper Kaiser
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Ralf Skyper Kaiser
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Ralf Skyper Kaiser
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Ralf Skyper Kaiser
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Jeff Jarmoc
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Johannes Merkle
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Dan Harkins
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically b… Ralf Skyper Kaiser