Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk

[Christian Huitema <[e-mail]>]

Weird. I sent this message this morning, and it did not arrive on the list.

On 5/22/2019 1:09 AM, Christian Huitema wrote:
> On 5/15/2019 6:20 AM, Joseph Salowey wrote:
>> The last call has come and gone without any comment.  Please indicate
>> if you have reviewed the draft even if you do not have issues to
>> raise so the chairs can see who has reviewed it.  Also indicate if
>> you have any plans to implement the draft. 
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2019 at 8:51 PM Joseph Salowey <[e-mail]
>> <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>>
>>     This is the working group last call for the "TLS 1.3 Extension
>>     for Certificate-based Authentication with an External Pre-Shared
>>     Key” draft available
>>     at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk/.
>>     Please review the document and send your comments to the list by
>>     2359 UTC on 23 April 2019.
>>
>
> My only comment regards the trade-off in this draft between privacy
> and resilience. The proposed method uses PSK to provide greater
> resilience against quantum-capable attackers, and as Russ says this is
> something that the US government cares about. But at the same time,
> the use of PSK requires inserting a PSK-ID in the client hello, which
> is sent in clear text. So we have a trade-off: government
> communications are less likely to be decrypted, but the PSK-ID will
> help track government employees. It might make sense to describe the
> trade-off explicitly in the draft, maybe in the security section.
>
> -- Christian Huitema
>