Re: [TLS] Use-case for non-AEAD ciphers in network monitoring

Darin Pettis <dpp.standards@gmail.com> Mon, 17 May 2021 21:04 UTC

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From: Darin Pettis <dpp.standards@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 17 May 2021 16:04:26 -0500
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Use-case for non-AEAD ciphers in network monitoring
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Hi Stephen,
Thanks for the quick reply as I know it is getting late in Ireland.

I’m sure you do remember the conversation as you spent a lot of time at the
microphone around it.  :-)

It is certainly not an easy question to answer but this group comprises the
smartest people that I know!!  Surely someone must be up for the challenge
as fully half of the people in that London hall voiced the need for it.
Furthermore, when the day comes that TLS 1.2 can’t be used anymore, for
whatever the reason, this need is going to come racing down the tracks…

So, while everyone is breathing easy right now, it would be great to
address the need proactively.

Respectfully,
Darin

On Mon, May 17, 2021 at 3:48 PM Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

>
> Hiya,
>
> On 17/05/2021 21:33, Darin Pettis wrote:
> > TLS 1.3 did a great job regarding safety of data on the Internet. For the
> > next version, let’s focus on how to best meet this used case
>
> I think we had this discussion a few years ago. There is
> no sensible boundary at which TLS can apply different
> cryptographic treatment.
>
> There were also many many other points raised at that
> time that I don't think we'll benefit from repeating.
>
> Cheers,
> S.
>