Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extension draft

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Thu, 26 April 2018 15:58 UTC

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Date: Thu, 26 Apr 2018 10:50:39 -0500
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extension draft
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On Thu, Apr 26, 2018 at 08:41:18AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 26, 2018 at 8:22 AM, Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
> wrote:
> > Because we'd pin only to the use of this extension, the TTL is
> > sufficient.
> 
> I explained in my response to Victor why this isn't so.

I don't accept that explanation.  It's based on a strawman argument.

> > > But this reinforces my point. I think we ought to have an enforce vs
> > > test flag and a report URI (and I I don't find your arguments above
> > > about why we shouldn't do this persuasive.)  Standardizing this
> > > functionality would require resolving these issues.
> >
> > Strawman.  These are make-believe issues.  Is it just to give the
> > appearance that we couldn't possibly reach consensus on just two bytes?
> 
> This discussion would probably be a lot more productive if you were able to
> have it without accusing other participants of acting in bad faith.

Sounds good to me.  One way to make this more civil is to not make
strawman arguments.

Nico
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