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Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extension draft

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Thu, 26 April 2018 15:57 UTC

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Date: Thu, 26 Apr 2018 10:49:35 -0500
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extension draft
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On Thu, Apr 26, 2018 at 11:41:05AM -0400, Richard Barnes wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 26, 2018 at 11:22 AM, Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
> wrote:
> 
> > On Thu, Apr 26, 2018 at 07:50:08AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > > On Thu, Apr 26, 2018 at 6:51 AM, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org
> > >
> > > wrote:
> > > > On Apr 26, 2018, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > >   * a lifetime field
> > > >   * enforce vs. test
> > > >   * a report URI
> >
> > We will need only the TTL.  We will not need anything else.  This is NOT
> > like HPKP.  This will pin only the use of the extension, and NOT EVEN
> > the use of DANE since you can send a denial of existence and you can
> > *always*[*] do that if you stop wanting DANE.
> 
> Until my DNSSEC signing infra breaks, the signatures expire, and now my
> server is bricked.

There is no way in which you can break your zone such that this pinning
gets you into trouble.  Here's why, there are only these possible
states:

 - you have TLSA RRs with a valid chain all the way to the root
   (works)

 - you don't have TLSA RRs and have a denial of existence chain
   (works)

 - your zone isn't signed, in which case you can prove this and we call
   that a denial of existence too
   (works)

 - your zone is bricked
   (fails because lookups fail)

If your zone is bricked then this extension doesn't even come into play
because clients will not be able to resolve your servers' hostnames,
therefore they won't even connect.

Nico
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