Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 draft

EKR <ekr@networkresonance.com> Tue, 06 March 2007 17:23 UTC

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To: martin.rex@sap.com
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 draft
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From: EKR <ekr@networkresonance.com>
Date: Tue, 06 Mar 2007 09:22:29 -0800
In-Reply-To: <200703061712.SAA29545@uw1048.wdf.sap.corp> (Martin Rex's message of "Tue, 6 Mar 2007 18:12:12 +0100 (MET)")
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Martin Rex <martin.rex@sap.com> writes:

> EKR wrote:
>> 
>>      - Remove ephemeral RSA [issue 3]
>
> This makes me sad.
>
> I would have SIGNIFICANTLY preferred if temporary/ephemeral RSA
> had been retained and the restriction to the RSA_EXPORT ciphersuites
> had been removed instead.
>
> As I had previously explained, the use of temporary/ephemeral RSA
> with same-strength keys as the server's certificate would make
> key-stealing of the servers' key much less useful for passive
> attacks.

The recommendation is to use RSA/DHE for these applications. Can
you explain why you think ephemeral RSA is superior?

Thanks,
-Ekr

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