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[TLS] Prohibiting RC4 Cipher Suites

Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com> Thu, 22 August 2013 07:35 UTC

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Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2013 10:35:38 +0300
From: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: [TLS] Prohibiting RC4 Cipher Suites
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Hi Andrei,

Thank you for the new draft. While I agree with the motivation and with 
the first two recommendations (do not offer RC4, do not accept RC4 - if 
possible!) I disagree that it is better to completely reject a client 
that offers only RC4, because the intuitive fallback for Web users is 
simply, don't do TLS. In a world of pervasive passive surveillance (see 
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass) we would prefer sessions 
to be encrypted even if it means that an active attacker, working hard, 
can break into them. And yes, the is the age old "false sense of 
security" discussion, yet again.

Thanks,
     Yaron
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass>

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