Re: [TLS] OPTLS: Signature-less TLS 1.3

[Watson Ladd <[e-mail]>]

On Nov 13, 2014 10:18 AM, "Salz, Rich" <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> I think the major concern is that this is a pretty radical change from
the current deployment model of SSL/TLS.  For what it's worth, I think it's
cool and clever and has a number of real nice properties. But we are
already getting 'picked on' for adding too many new things, and I am
concerned that adding this, fairly late in the game, will delay the
deployment of TLS 1.3 as people will take a step back and consider if they
really need to use this revolutionary new protocol, rather than the
evolutionary changes they were expecting.
>
> I used my personal opinion here, but I feel pretty comfortable saying I'm
not the only one who feels this way. It's a case of "too much, too late."
>
> Does that make sense?
>
> Can we wrap up TLS 1.3 and perhaps do a TLS 2 based on these concepts,
including a  non-CA trust model?

Wrap up what exactly? The TLS 1.3 draft as it stands has had very little
security analysis applied. Important questions remain to be resolved. It's
already a major change from TLS 1.2 and increasingly so as more gets
reworked.

OPTLS is not something to be added as an option on top of whatever else we
want. It's a protocol that solves the problems TLS 1.3 was intended to
solve, and to do so with a design that takes advantage of our knowledge of
security analysis.

Whatever deployment issues exist will exist for TLS 1.3: reuse of TCP
connections reduces the impact of latency.

TLS 2 could do a lot more for security: use formal languages to make
parsing easy, make implementation simplicity a priority.  I doubt the IETF
ever could achieve this: we had IRC and now have XMPP, to name the most
egregious example.

While you can use a different deployment model you don't have to: certs can
be put on all frontend machines exactly as now.

As for non-CA trust model, I'm not sure we have a good one that includes
all uses of TLS: I'd like to know what you propose,  but I'm not sure this
list is the place.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd
>
>         /r$
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
>[e-mail]
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls