Re: [TLS] Are the AEAD cipher suites a security trade-off win with TLS1.2?

Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Mon, 21 March 2016 06:20 UTC

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Harlan Lieberman-Berg <hlieberman@setec.io>, "mrex@sap.com" <mrex@sap.com>, =?iso-8859-1?Q?Colm_MacC=E1rthaigh?= <colm@allcosts.net>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Are the AEAD cipher suites a security trade-off win with TLS1.2?
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Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2016 06:20:41 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Are the AEAD cipher suites a security trade-off win with TLS1.2?
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Harlan Lieberman-Berg <hlieberman@setec.io>; writes:

>Couldn't you say the same about CTR mode, or stream ciphers themselves?

Yep, the KSG ciphers are all equally bad, just RC4 in another form.
Microsoft, and the downstream users of its APIs, were do badly burned by this
over and over again that their build tools now flag any use of RC4 as a
security failure.

Peter.