[TLS]Re: Trust Anchor Negotiation Surveillance Concerns and Risks

Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> Mon, 22 July 2024 17:32 UTC

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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2024 10:32:04 -0700
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To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
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Subject: [TLS]Re: Trust Anchor Negotiation Surveillance Concerns and Risks
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On Mon, Jul 22, 2024 at 9:53 AM David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
wrote:

>
> Second, it assumes that the non-web PKI client does not care about the DNS
> name used. When DNS names are purely internal routing labels for API
> endpoints, etc., the exact DNS name used is not particularly significant.
> But when they are user-visible, e.g. in the UI of a web browser,
> redirecting to client-specific services isn't viable. In those situations,
> we similarly would need a different solution.
>

 I looked up the term "dns names" in Google Chrome, through the location
bar, which is not only used for DNS names. The URL I got back was this:

<
https://www.google.com/search?q=dns+names&oq=dns+names&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyCQgAEEUYORiABDIHCAEQABiABDIHCAIQABiABDIHCAMQABiABDIHCAQQABiABDIHCAUQABiABDIHCAYQABiABDIHCAcQABiABDIHCAgQABiABDIJCAkQABgKGIAE0gEIMjE1NGowajeoAgCwAgA&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
>

This argument doesn't seem compelling to me, aside from the other parts of
the discussion.

thanks,
Rob