Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extensions security considerations

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Tue, 26 June 2018 16:18 UTC

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Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 11:18:49 -0500
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>
Cc: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extensions security considerations
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On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 09:20:16PM -0700, Joseph Salowey wrote:
> 1.  Do you support the working group taking on future work on a pinning
> mechanism (based on the modifications or another approach)?

Yes with a caveat: I don't much care whether pinning work gets done as
an individual submission, as a TLS WG work item, or some other WG's work
item.

> 2.  Do you support the reserved bytes in the revision for a future pinning
> mechanism?

Yes.  I prefer just the two bytes we asked for, but I'm also happy with
the optional up-to-255-byte hole.  I'm not at all interested in more
complex holes.

> 3.  Do you support the proof of denial of existence text in the revision?

Yes.

> 4.  Do you support the new and improved security considerations?

Yes.

Nico
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