Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically better for TLS 1.3

[Robert Ransom <[e-mail]>]

On 11/3/13, Ralf Skyper Kaiser <[e-mail]> wrote:

>> * Applications can also use renegotiation-based rekeying to improve
>> forward secrecy; for example, the Mixminion specification
>> (<
>> https://github.com/nmathewson/mixminion-doc/blob/a661212831d2afc3200339b2634ca16452e3aeec/spec/minion-spec.txt
>> >,
>> section 4, line 1040) requires that relay-to-relay TLS connections be
>> rekeyed using renegotiation every 15 minutes for this purpose.
>>
>
> Mixminion falsely assume  that the security degrades if a connection is
> live for more than 15 minutes. That's security wise not true. In today's
> security design (TLS) the negotiated session key material is secure for
> years (if not decades). Gone are the times when DES was used and DES could
> be cracked in 24h and it was desirable to use a new DES key every 24 hours.
> Gone. Gone Gone.
>
> If you negotiate session keys that could be cracked within a year you
> should not have negotiated those sessions keys in the first place.

Mixminion correctly assumes that anyone who obtains a session key by
compromising a server can use that key to decrypt all traffic
protected by it, no matter how long brute-force search would have
taken to find the key.


Robert Ransom