Re: [TLS] OCSP must staple

[Geoffrey Keating <[e-mail]>]

Kyle Hamilton <[e-mail]> writes:

> On the other hand, I think that relying on a stapled response is perhaps
> shortsighted, as it potentially opens a window of vulnerability.  Say
> the OCSP response is valid for 7 days (the maximum time that EV cert
> OCSP responses can be valid for): if the cert is revoked on day 2,
> that's still 5 and change days of potential validity.  This is the kind
> of vulnerability that clients can use the OCSP nonce extension to
> protect themselves from, but it only works if it's used and queried from
> the OCSP responder by the client itself.  Thus, the proposal to prevent
> clients from checking OCSP from the source in the presence of an "OCSP
> must staple" extension is harmful to user security and thus wrong-minded.

I think a CA that supports OCSP with nonces would probably not be
using 'must staple'.  However very few do so and so there are no
clients that I know of that actually require a nonce in the reply; and
the OCSP protocol doesn't distinguish between 'you sent a nonce but I
will not reply with one' and 'you did not send a nonce', so the effect
is that nonces do not practically contribute to OCSP security.