Re: [TLS] Middlebox Security Protocol initial drafts
Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Fri, 13 April 2018 16:26 UTC
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2018 09:26:07 -0700
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To: Tony Rutkowski <trutkowski.netmagic@gmail.com>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, cybersupport@etsi.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Middlebox Security Protocol initial drafts
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n Fri, Apr 13, 2018 at 9:19 AM, Tony Rutkowski < trutkowski.netmagic@gmail.com> wrote: > Good observation. When the work started, 1.3 was a work in progress and > the rapporteurs wanted to move forward with an initial test of concept > based on considerable published work out there. In addition, the use of > 1.2 will be around for many years if not forever in some environments. > I certainly agree that this is true, but given that you're designing a new protocol, it's not clear to me that the installed base is that relevant. I also don't think this addresses the question of algorithms, given that TLS 1.2 supports modern algorithms -Ekr The idea is to start a momentum for enabling middlebox visibility and > traffic observability (Part 1), and then rolling out and encouraging > multiple profiles. > > To give credit here, the concepts are those of pioneers like David Naylor > and Justine Sherry. (Her slogan that "middleboxes are the drama queens of > networking" has become legend.) > > Tony > > On Apr 13, 2018 11:36 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote: > > Hi Tony, > > Thanks for forwarding these. > > I haven't had time to give them a thorough review, but on a quick skim I > notice that this seems to be based on TLS 1.2 and to use a bunch of > algorithms we are trying to deprecate (e.g., CBC). Is there a reason not to > start with TLS 1.3 and more modern algorithms? > > -Ekr > > > > > On Fri, Apr 13, 2018 at 8:07 AM, Tony Rutkowski < > trutkowski.netmagic@gmail.com> wrote: > > As everyone is aware, the decision was taken > within the IETF TLS community not to undertake > work perceived to compromise TLS 1.3 and related > protocols. At the same time, there has been > recognition that a considerable number of use > cases exist where alternative transport, network > and application layer implementations are > necessary in both network infrastructures and data > centres. > > The work on those alternative implementations has > proceeded over a two year period in ETSI's Cyber > Security Technical Committee (TC CYBER). In the > spirit of some level of collaboration between ETSI > and the IETF community, as well as public > transparency, CYBER is making available two draft > parts of a Technical Specification called the > Middlebox Security Protocol. The motivation is to > address one of the most difficult security > challenges today: how to enable network operators > and end-users to cooperate in managing encryption > security for their applications. The drafts are > available at: > > https://docbox.etsi.org/CYBER/CYBER/Open/Latest_Drafts > > Note that there are two problems being pursued > here. The Middlebox Security Protocol enables the > existence of a “smart proxy” where end-users can > be potentially aware of a middlebox in their > traffic stream (visibility) and control what that > middlebox sees for different purposes > (observability). The result allows for balancing > privacy, network operations, and security for > different applications. With the Protocol, both > users and providers gain the ability to grant or > restrict the permissions for visibility and > observability. > > Part 1 of the Middlebox Security Protocol > specification defines the generic capabilities and > security requirements. Additional parts define > specific implementations in the form of profiles > for different use cases that can be mapped to the > Part 1 requirements. > > Part 2 provides a common profile for widespread > network use known in the research community as > mcTLS. Included with Part 2 are a patch for a > known vulnerability as well as an exemplar of use > by Mobile Network Operators. Other profiles will > be released over the coming months – especially > one for data centre access control to meet the > critical needs of enterprise network communities. > > These initial two draft specifications are > relatively complete and stable, and derived from > best-of-breed solutions drawn from extensive > surveys and evaluation of the considerable > published technical literature. However, this > work is new, complex, and unique. > > In addition, TC CYBER is proactively sending the > drafts to other industry standards bodies as well > as holding a Hot Middlebox Workshop (12 June 2018) > and Hackathon (12-13 June 2018), in Sophia-Antipolis > France, where the coding community can seek to > implement and hack a test implementation of Part 2. > It is all open, and free. > > In addition to collaboration and comments on this list, > comments are also solicited at cybersupport@etsi.org > > --tony r > > > > >
- Re: [TLS] Middlebox Security Protocol initial dra… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Middlebox Security Protocol initial dra… Eric Rescorla