Re: [TLS] A closer look at ROBOT, BB Attacks, timing attacks in general, and what we can do in TLS

Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com> Fri, 15 December 2017 18:03 UTC

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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: "ilariliusvaara@welho.com" <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
CC: =?utf-8?B?Q29sbSBNYWNDw6FydGhhaWdo?= <colm@allcosts.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] A closer look at ROBOT, BB Attacks, timing attacks in general, and what we can do in TLS
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Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2017 18:03:46 +0000
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/4wWCEZb7ZAQfc_4PMDCAtzS4CVw>
Subject: Re: [TLS] A closer look at ROBOT, BB Attacks, timing attacks in general, and what we can do in TLS
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Correct.

-----Original Message-----
From: ilariliusvaara@welho.com [mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com] 
Sent: Friday, December 15, 2017 9:46 AM
To: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>;
Cc: Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net>;; tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] A closer look at ROBOT, BB Attacks, timing attacks in general, and what we can do in TLS

On Fri, Dec 15, 2017 at 02:57:33PM +0000, Andrei Popov wrote:
> From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ilari Liusvaara
> > Even nastier dependency: SHA-2. If that breaks, currently both TLS
> > 1.2 and 1.3 break. There are no alternatives defined.
> 
> Here's an attempt to define a SHA-2 alternative: 
> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftools
> .ietf.org%2Fhtml%2Fdraft-wconner-blake2sigs-01&data=04%7C01%7CAndrei.P
> opov%40microsoft.com%7C30de6e3a48024110441608d543e3c8b7%7C72f988bf86f1
> 41af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C636489567969040822%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZs
> b3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwifQ%3D%3D%7C-1&
> sdata=f72MvX0ydw5WvjkvngbY39sai8v9oOc5ZUYZOQI3XmI%3D&reserved=0

Also would need TLS ciphersuite codepoints with alternative handshake hash algorithms.


-Ilari