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[TLS] Re: Working group last call for the deprecation experimental code points in ECDHE-ML-KEM

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Wed, 05 November 2025 08:58 UTC

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Date: Wed, 05 Nov 2025 19:58:28 +1100
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: [TLS] Re: Working group last call for the deprecation experimental code points in ECDHE-ML-KEM
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On Wed, Nov 05, 2025 at 09:44:43AM +0100, Bas Westerbaan wrote:

> we know for sure they'll fall to quantum attack

This assumes that:

    - We know for sure that quantum attacks will eventually materialise.
    - We know for sure that the timeframe is soon enough to matter.

If quantum attacks don't materialise for the next 100+ years, it is
unlikey that much secret communication that falls to quantum attacks
100+ years from now needs that sort of long-term protection.

I don't have certain answers to either of those key assumptions.
There's sufficient room for reasonable skepticism with regard to both.

-- 
    Viktor.  🇺🇦 Слава Україні!

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