Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00.txt

I want to see these disappear, but I am guessing that there is still
some time before many products can make the move.  For websites, like
the ones mentioned in the draft, that time is already here.  As a site
operator, you do not want to talk to a browser that doesn't talk TLS
1.2.

Is there any reason why we wouldn't also consider deprecating cipher
suites we don't like?  For instance, RFC 5246 mandates the
implementation of TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, which we can probably
agree isn't ideal for several reasons.  The ECDHE suites with AES-GCM
are widely available, perhaps widely enough that we might consider a
stronger move and update 5246 to modern suites.

Our numbers for AES-CBC are not anywhere near as low as TLS <1.2, but
they are definitely trending in the right direction.  3DES still
exists too, which is a little sad, but there you are.
On Tue, Jul 10, 2018 at 2:42 AM Kathleen Moriarty
<kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Hello,
>
> Stephen and I posted the draft below to see if the TLS working group
> is ready to take steps to deprecate TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1.  There has
> been a recent drop off in usage for web applications due to the PCI
> Council recommendation to move off TLSv1.0, with a recommendation to
> go to TLSv1.2 by June 30th.  NIST has also been recommending TLSv1.2
> as a baseline.  Applications other than those using HTTP may not have
> had the same reduction in usage.  If you are responsible for services
> where you have a reasonable vantage point to gather and share
> statistics to assess usage further, that could be helpful for the
> discussion.  We've received some feedback that has been incorporated
> into the working draft and feelers in general have been positive.  It
> would be good to know if there are any show stoppers that have not
> been considered.
>
> https://github.com/sftcd/tls-oldversions-diediedie
>
> Thanks in advance,
> Kathleen
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From:  <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> Date: Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 3:05 PM
> Subject: New Version Notification for
> draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00.txt
> To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, Kathleen Moriarty
> <Kathleen.Moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
>
>
>
> A new version of I-D, draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Stephen Farrell and posted to the
> IETF repository.
>
> Name:           draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie
> Revision:       00
> Title:          Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1
> Document date:  2018-06-18
> Group:          Individual Submission
> Pages:          10
> URL:
> https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00.txt
> Status:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie/
> Htmlized:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00
> Htmlized:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie
>
>
> Abstract:
>    This document [if approved] formally deprecates Transport Layer
>    Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1 [RFC4346] and moves
>    these documents to the historic state.  These versions lack support
>    for current and recommended cipher suites, and various government and
>    industry profiiles of applications using TLS now mandate avoiding
>    these old TLS versions.  TLSv1.2 has been the recommended version for
>    IETF protocols since 2008, providing sufficient time to transition
>    away from older versions.  Products having to support older versions
>    increase the attack surface unnecessarily and increase opportunities
>    for misconfigurations.  Supporting these older versions also requires
>    additional effort for library and product maintenance.
>
>    This document updates the backward compatibility sections of TLS RFCs
>    [[list TBD]] to prohibit fallback to TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1.  This
>    document also updates RFC 7525.
>
>
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> The IETF Secretariat
>
>
>
> --
>
> Best regards,
> Kathleen
>
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