Re: [TLS] [POSSIBLE SPAM] Re: Asking the browser for a different certificate

"Kemp, David P." <> Tue, 30 March 2010 14:24 UTC

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Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2010 10:24:44 -0400
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Thread-Topic: [POSSIBLE SPAM] Re: [TLS] Asking the browser for a different certificate
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From: "Kemp, David P." <>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [POSSIBLE SPAM] Re: Asking the browser for a different certificate
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What is this, a little geek humor? Jerry Seinfeld doing TLS standup?  It
gave me a good chuckle anyway.

If there exists an atomic mutual authentication protocol (nothing about
either party is revealed to the other until both become aware of the
other's authenticated identity), then it hasn't been written up as a TLS
ciphersuite.  Until that magic happens, ADH is a pretty standard way of
reducing ID exposure from an infinite number of attackers down to 1
active party and 0 passive parties.  That's a fairly significant


-----Original Message-----
From: [] On Behalf Of
Marsh Ray
>> Kyle Hamilton wrote:
> There's no way to know if you've negotiated ADH with an attacker --
> but you've only got one attacker, Mallory.

You can't know that, either.

If there were some way to know this (say IP hop count), you could simply
get a trusted party to "attack" you and thus gain immunity from other