Re: [TLS] Broken browser behaviour with SCADA TLS

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Thu, 05 July 2018 23:52 UTC

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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Jul 2018 09:51:54 +1000
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To: mrex@sap.com
Cc: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Broken browser behaviour with SCADA TLS
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On Fri, Jul 6, 2018 at 4:51 AM Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>; wrote:
> Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>; wrote:
> > The problem with DHE of course being that it uses the TLS 1.0 suites
> > with the SHA1 MAC and with the MAC and encrypt in the wrong order.
>
> I'm confused about what you are thinking here.

Just that we don't implement MtE because it was hard and AEAD is
better, that's all.