[TLS] Also, on client-random and server-random

Ravi Ganesan <ravi@findravi.com> Wed, 03 February 2010 04:21 UTC

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From: Ravi Ganesan <ravi@findravi.com>
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Subject: [TLS] Also, on client-random and server-random
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FWIW, in my deconstruction of why these values exist, it seemed to me
that if you ran the full handshake with only the server-random, and
the abbreviated handshake with only the client-random, you were ok
against the attacks known. (not suggesting one run it without both;
just making an observation as it helps us analyze the importance of
the server-random in abbreviated hanshake).