[TLS] Re: Complaint to ADs and IESG regarding TLS WG chairs falsely claiming WG consensus to issue an RFC for draft-ietf-tls-mldsa

Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Wed, 27 May 2026 21:12 UTC

Return-Path: <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: tls@mail2.ietf.org
Delivered-To: tls@mail2.ietf.org
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail2.ietf.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1995BF63AC82 for <tls@mail2.ietf.org>; Wed, 27 May 2026 14:12:14 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=ietf.org; s=ietf1; t=1779916334; bh=A+DdGTOpborvwWZv/t+JQbQIFu30IfJzZ9o7u9PKu6M=; h=References:In-Reply-To:From:Date:Subject:To:Cc; b=izAbvyt/LMHp0fSFf1WMH0O2Z6GhCYlpx/Of/k51hItR5BOIFDGhAKM4UHSYcPwYo OVIM/wwyqeGwmiE1G9R4BnsWVUfR85bkUOqearAO1E8nbUNW1JWP2IkmkgDsrLlMta Cap5WoB4hWaTV1Yg8gbtuo9QGqJJglujV6LYrjDk=
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at ietf.org
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.099
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.099 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: mail2.ietf.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com
Received: from mail2.ietf.org ([166.84.6.31]) by localhost (mail2.ietf.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 87aZt2Wv7bao for <tls@mail2.ietf.org>; Wed, 27 May 2026 14:12:13 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-wr1-x430.google.com (mail-wr1-x430.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::430]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (128/128 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (P-256) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mail2.ietf.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CAAA5F63AB82 for <tls@ietf.org>; Wed, 27 May 2026 14:11:35 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-wr1-x430.google.com with SMTP id ffacd0b85a97d-44e1860558fso7670291f8f.0 for <tls@ietf.org>; Wed, 27 May 2026 14:11:35 -0700 (PDT)
ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1779916288; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20240605; b=V+rVF/WaBdlWxdAjU2627WEm595b4N0hiUkzztabLHQbgg/9qx/K80y44yoGR0WFVG u+ERgkDopHj/WFm+5vkY01TOo+nJJqkyuF3dnM+kkUr9sShgZ5xv0jKiLqVycDwhu8lW ST/4/KMiHOC5BuktshafSmo1shzO8+CSePZOWtp5oQBgynkSfdw4VA4BzhCbChA2LryH D7LwlkKN+K7JB3iIgxJO5lGS06ePAj2KsOfD8lU8Pgy/tTrPWwH9QNGWbrNbFNLemKJb fz/ff18aE79UdtEpDHkNndYor46gIYAxfF7zEWT5ruUF6RQOa0HIUQrU2BD7eCxwy178 9+EQ==
ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20240605; h=content-transfer-encoding:cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from :in-reply-to:references:mime-version:dkim-signature; bh=lusu34QHArrt8RWW1d3T+lCIBJ5RptYEgRZRcr8V640=; fh=9uoqlxOvC8iT9e+nl0gYAAu20CTsqj66eGnvBQr+23o=; b=hd6rlVkQUn6TZOY1E1b0rHWdd5m8G5k4w3xEnG8M1/WC6Uwl6/N6wfRIA6+HsRehQG isckkOd17Zojgo+0QgWCkf4d+05CqZFqKFsIkZBp70lMbgCJUMfmXOHawMCuiYASvf0o tbIY0Kyb8rHDDwCV/EtJPPoAmk+BIXwlGS88fBK3+jO7ryRbVwQNy20LOCXacRZ8hGD4 0BmmxnmhjVwn/+8ss0W0vcuDX0uaVfIauwSBT8KFZgBnrvdmUzWkVkdsmXEpGV/kfutY 3vvzH3Ahyom6nxZ8XAYreY5qOUYHkAI2fJQ50U/0n7vdJMem22GDION9usoZT/tB3sHr EIKw==; darn=ietf.org
ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; arc=none
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20251104; t=1779916288; x=1780521088; darn=ietf.org; h=content-transfer-encoding:cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from :in-reply-to:references:mime-version:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=lusu34QHArrt8RWW1d3T+lCIBJ5RptYEgRZRcr8V640=; b=Eb5CTZyl66CNm2uBzllPTFqt+v9eHPWbGkD4WF7l2TJSDN9SpGDDHlgk/XtBPrCM9g ZATL5AR9Zok/9Oq5aYV89ZMTPAJieGeGyhyYsaipHfa3BJOjIOByi5M/dkKTV/cIAbVI pUAXlosfx0RwPKb6WopUJrgYngYqKzELPWgtwJu96qSDXGB2p3q6fcbS3vNqHA94jgvW lveSgD8faK59fz3YyXBV0M+u4bVgGSeTdyYiACCjRVCvQA7RAksH67gM6ZYZbpeV7SN8 HjFDyZZ15mb9vsOGFDhkNAsvhtecEoA6cxw4qhh7/escWdnKLSQo4liInJR4kS1nUtLQ R74Q==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20251104; t=1779916288; x=1780521088; h=content-transfer-encoding:cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from :in-reply-to:references:mime-version:x-gm-gg:x-gm-message-state:from :to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=lusu34QHArrt8RWW1d3T+lCIBJ5RptYEgRZRcr8V640=; b=DxaE/hALYMxvDOGxLztOYriiZ1Tkzse9SZnSZmfs3++m3bcRU5DoAV0obv17Cb2GbH RuULMctqh07dIWFJQiDb3DZyzYhSLmV0njzeC91ersduqbTVnY3f+0iUiIrZOUIo0v7N A8Cm/PhsFAdvXB8NENrYkmhBSUH8bDu53iZVC6jubiI4NH2MUgBMHHug1AcYD70GULFs OCWUqgXgOyyri0MDA9B8RH9CQ9XUKZXOhg5nEX/+C1PoConteMq0ttHKBrTEI6CU/Fgr IhGM/BHCLl5qIFckGQ2a7tnfN7U4hu7Txkm/jEjS/ULi00AvWmIjmEZap3XfAO4orAiS p8ZQ==
X-Forwarded-Encrypted: i=1; AFNElJ/79XChvCA2J3U0fqohXwOZr8obUnXlgmPOs5MvqQxvdA+7etKfBwJQWR2hMBEZgP+tTGA=@ietf.org
X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0Yz3eYx6bZqpw1Wp9oIz3vz/qawTazhBCos9vOA4A2qjpZJkWnje 7c1es0EF4ddcOYJmvEDYWSX4HtEqdZ3h7ccl+pfMzLTwoxr7PRC2upYdbo5xBgA9iKZY5W/St7B gSY6Ncf6Zi3bcdeskGCjamg8k/WPyaLk=
X-Gm-Gg: Acq92OEC0Jqbl3JERbyanTKKsEg+D8y++M0HzNxYInVucSMuOVBnBk6fS4DBUilz6Gy jsZXbWWknJjIqC/hUFiKRqHlIDre2XhfVW3z8sBL1OWqFq0WL5xxWA8YjCPsf5BBZ+C3Rm0NMQA oY7d6ZJAKsANsISsG4Rm0hcJAQFbkWl7jPFwfF1gFLmg6pykWYuJgtN/0YQWQXaw3/+gt/rivQ4 DTEnrLFVbjT0eQHr+Mn9ONKwEAQkiYTXgMNhksVoXA7WxayUtMmiZThUhFPfm06PBBHEiKNnnm9 UNmAyYQ7m+e6nN5czdybqgqZjuaC+V1fh4IzrwlLKgp7K1/oJkWjtdzoR5VeXBfjNkEr8Fx6qHp nQTPg9lQrzXMNQIZr/IW+VqXAopND/Bp45kcm0VoQ1OznqUhcgX7bPdi6zvtQ/QKrYyIk
X-Received: by 2002:a05:6000:25f6:b0:45e:9115:2982 with SMTP id ffacd0b85a97d-45eb38d8177mr40002693f8f.34.1779916288490; Wed, 27 May 2026 14:11:28 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <20260519112813.1254795.qmail@cr.yp.to> <CAGgd1Ocy8f4HeQy-qWauAJAxizznXdXA53kWVp_FV1QUVGuxWw@mail.gmail.com> <5DFBF81F-4A98-4C5E-A060-580DC6960021@symbolic.software> <87v7c8lgt8.fsf@josefsson.org> <CACsn0cmaOdG4vCdeOVSxAPnJtPRH8rBJ3sfAY3o0f1fm-ouceg@mail.gmail.com> <ahddRzOIvQDXcvaG@ubby>
In-Reply-To: <ahddRzOIvQDXcvaG@ubby>
From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 14:11:16 -0700
X-Gm-Features: AVHnY4J414qCT0vJenF8u1iERrgrFMXomcINxZBDYNv1QHd0G8IZnIiry6oJz48
Message-ID: <CACsn0cnStbBw8Szq+McPumjExnbL=3wmwESYEMWczJJZbJXRgw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-ID-Hash: OMKRX4NBPIOSCFYHUTZGU2AODD4GGMRP
X-Message-ID-Hash: OMKRX4NBPIOSCFYHUTZGU2AODD4GGMRP
X-MailFrom: watsonbladd@gmail.com
X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation; header-match-tls.ietf.org-0; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header
CC: Simon Josefsson <simon=40josefsson.org@dmarc.ietf.org>, Nadim Kobeissi <nadim@symbolic.software>, TLS List <tls@ietf.org>, "D. J. Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to>, stndrds-inacio@andrew.cmu.edu, "<iesg@ietf.org>" <iesg@ietf.org>
X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.9rc6
Precedence: list
Subject: [TLS] Re: Complaint to ADs and IESG regarding TLS WG chairs falsely claiming WG consensus to issue an RFC for draft-ietf-tls-mldsa
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/5Ifmy-q2rD9YqmDqQwxXoJax_Kk>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Owner: <mailto:tls-owner@ietf.org>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Subscribe: <mailto:tls-join@ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:tls-leave@ietf.org>

On Wed, May 27, 2026 at 2:08 PM Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, May 27, 2026 at 02:01:08PM -0700, Watson Ladd wrote:
> > On Wed, May 27, 2026, 1:48 PM Simon Josefsson <simon=
> > 40josefsson.org@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> > > Repeating that statement doesn't make it true.  The analog motivation
> > > for doing PQ hybrids is Man-In-The-Middle attacks.  If your non-hybrid
> > > PQ signature has a weakness (e.g., implementation bug), it facilitate
> > > man-in-the-middle's.
> > >
> >
> > The only way to achieve that is to have a quantum computer at the time of
> > attack
>
> Not so.  Find the victim's classical public key (they'll gladly tell you
> it), use a quantum computer to break it off-line and recover the private
> key, then use the private key at will to impersonate the victim, then
> its counterparties become victims too.

Correct: you have to have a quantum computer *before* mounting the attack.

Or to put another way, todays connections are not compromised by
tomorrows computers.
>
> Nico
> --



-- 
Astra mortemque praestare gradatim