Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> Mon, 10 July 2017 23:12 UTC

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From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2017 19:12:04 -0400
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...
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On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 3:37 PM, Stephen Farrell
<stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>; wrote:
>
> And if coercion of a server to comply with a wiretap
> scheme like this stills fanciful to you, please check
> out the history of lavabit - had there been a standard
> wiretap API as envisaged here it's pretty certain that
> would have been the device of choice in a case like that.
> While it's easy enough to envisage many other abuses
> that could be based on this wiretap scheme, that one is
> a good match and a real one.

There's a lot of insight based on the history.

If the mechanism operated at layer 3 or 4 (modify the protocol), then
the net is cast overly wide in a shared hosting arrangement. That is,
all virtual host's traffic is captured and recovered.

If it operates at layer 6 or 7 (modify the applications and/or its
libraries, like Apache or Nginx), then there is more precision in
target traffic. That is, only the target's traffic can captured and
recovered.

Jeff