[TLS] TLS 1.2

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Fri, 26 August 2005 23:48 UTC

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Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2005 16:49:34 -0700
From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: [TLS] TLS 1.2
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Folks,

I'd like to start a discussion on whether we should be thinking
about a TLS 1.2 that was more oriented towards newer hash 
functions. Obviously, we're not at a point where there's
a crisis yet but it doesn't hurt to be prepared.

Steve Bellovin's and my take on this can be found at:

http://www.educatedguesswork.org/movabletype/archives/2005/07/deploying_a_new.html

Thinking ahead, if we get much list discussion we should probably
plan to have some time in Vancouver...

-Ekr



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