[TLS] basic off-list bullying

Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> Wed, 23 October 2019 05:26 UTC

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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2019 22:26:02 -0700
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Subject: [TLS] basic off-list bullying
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Hi, I thought I would help to characterize some basic "crypto" bullying.

This kind of thing is not easy for every participant to deflect, so I
thought I would share some email traffic in my inbox.

thanks,
Rob

[me]
> "And, as I wrote, I am not an expert in these matters. From what I do
know, I think padding the buffer to the maximum likely size seems like a
good idea."

[respondent]
> "Usually not a good idea to go with what “seems” like a good idea.
Crypto is often not obvious"

[me]
> "I am totally ok with a brutal on-list takedown of my message. That would
shake out truth, and that is good."

[respondent]
> "Shrug.  Not from me, not this time :)"

[me]
> "It seems hard to argue against 256 characters for this use case. There
isn't even an efficiency argument, since ClientHello messages are pretty
small."

thanks,
Rob