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Re: [TLS] Deprecating more (DSA?) (was Re: Deprecating RC4 (was: draft-ietf-tls-encrypt-then-mac))

Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> Tue, 15 April 2014 18:15 UTC

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Date: Tue, 15 Apr 2014 14:15:11 -0400
From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
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To: Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Deprecating more (DSA?) (was Re: Deprecating RC4 (was: draft-ietf-tls-encrypt-then-mac))
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On 04/15/2014 10:03 AM, Hanno Böck wrote:
> My opinion on that is that we should have multiple lines of defense.
> Sure, if the RNG is bad we should fix it. But we all know good RNGs is
> a nontrivial problem. So while fixing RNGs is a priority, we also should
> have algorithms that don't completely break so badly that they spit out
> the public key if the RNG fails.

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6979 suggests a way to use DSA that
doesn't break as catastrophically if the RNG fails.

	--dkg

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