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Re: [TLS] datacenter TLS decryption as a three-party protocol

Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> Sun, 23 July 2017 22:28 UTC

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References: <CAAF6GDeFuRy0DN6w3FwmR_nh1G=YBi4+qiEcw0MfSRj4SUCbZQ@mail.gmail.com> <20170720200114.AA2F91A6CB@ld9781.wdf.sap.corp> <06AE85BC-87AD-4CA5-8408-44F670358701@ll.mit.edu> <20170720203238.e66zurx5yn2jja3a@LK-Perkele-VII> <17109486-336E-44C0-B9FC-D65EE14310B5@ll.mit.edu> <20170723070240.x7kmynzmu4jqco5t@LK-Perkele-VII> <C0772D29-CB26-418F-981B-BC2E2435E655@ll.mit.edu> <35FD3356-8300-405A-B8D8-FC2574DB9A56@fugue.com> <CE89217F-972F-4F37-B8BA-925AE1FE8D68@ll.mit.edu> <44105D6B-4CE0-4C3C-ACFA-30EF1D8AA8F7@fugue.com> <318b4504-08b3-e2db-026b-a79ea4d1aec2@huitema.net>
From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 23 Jul 2017 18:28:47 -0400
Message-ID: <CAH8yC8=gwOen5CsGkVRv-b519mAF5vTg0+X853GVrQffYyCMAg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] datacenter TLS decryption as a three-party protocol
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On Sun, Jul 23, 2017 at 5:37 PM, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net> wrote:
> ...
> Speaking of threat model, one of the main threats is the "Lavabit" case: a
> server is asked to somehow implement a backdoor so existing clients. In that
> case, it is very useful for clients to detect that something has changed.
> They can move away and use another server.

That existed long before LavaBit. Hushmail FTW!

I was saddened to see a Canadian company cooperate with US law
enforcement by backdooring their applet. (Give credit where credit is
due).

Jeff

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