[TLS] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-03: (with COMMENT)

Roman Danyliw via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Tue, 17 December 2019 01:50 UTC

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Subject: [TLS] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-03: (with COMMENT)
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Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-03: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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* Section 7. The paragraphs that start with “In this extension, the external
PSK preserves secrecy if the EC(DH) key agreement” …” and “In the future, if
the (EC)DH key agreement ..” seem to be saying the same thing differently.

* Section 7. It’s worth mentioning somewhere the obvious thing – how to
generate, distribute, manage the external PSKs is out of scope for this
specification.

* Section 7.  Per “TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] has received careful security analysis,
and some informal reasoning shows that the addition of this extension does not
introduce any security defects”, is there a citation for this “informal
reasoning”?  Otherwise, it’s a soft statement.

* Editorial Nits:
- Section 3.  Typo.  s/inclue/include/

- Section 5.1. Typo. s/extension are/extensions are/

- Section 5.1. /Most of those extension are not impacted in any way.  This
section discusses the impacts on the other extensions./Most of those extension
are not impacted in any way by this specification.  However, this section
discusses the extensions that require additional consideration./

- Section 5.1.  Typo. s/may be know to other partiers/may be known to other
parties/

- Section 5.1. Typo. s/know to other parties/known to other parties/

- Section 7.  Typo.  s/that external PSK/that the external PSK/