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Re: [TLS] [pkix] Cert Enumeration and Key Assurance With DNSSEC

Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Tue, 05 October 2010 18:40 UTC

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Date: Tue, 05 Oct 2010 14:41:06 -0400
To: Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net>
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Cc: pkix@ietf.org, dnsop@ietf.org, saag@ietf.org, tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] [pkix] Cert Enumeration and Key Assurance With DNSSEC
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At 2:30 PM -0400 10/4/10, Michael StJohns wrote:
>Hi -
>
>DNSSEC seems to be picking on PKIX and vice versa - maybe the right 
>answer is both?

I don't see the proposed work as a war between X.509 certs and signed 
DNS records. I think that they are potentially complementary security 
mechanisms.

>...
>What if - the PKIX certificate for the host contained a "permit" for 
>the name signed by the DNS owner?  A signature over the hash of the 
>public key in the certificate, and the DNS name - and maybe some 
>expiration info verifiable by the data in DNSSEC?

We have avoided putting additional signatures in a public-key cert, 
so I'm not comfortable with a proposal that does so.  Is there a way 
to reverse this, so that the cert contains a hash of a key from the 
DNS, and there is a (signed) DNS record that covers the cert?

Steve

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