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[TLS]Re: Trust Anchor Negotiation Surveillance Concerns and Risks

Dennis Jackson <ietf@dennis-jackson.uk> Tue, 23 July 2024 18:28 UTC

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From: Dennis Jackson <ietf@dennis-jackson.uk>
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Subject: [TLS]Re: Trust Anchor Negotiation Surveillance Concerns and Risks
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On 23/07/2024 11:08, Watson Ladd wrote:

> Applications that don't support aren't worse off because other 
> applications can use a newer PKI with fewer problems.

The sub-thread Mike started has been specifically on whether we can 
bring Trust Expressions to non-browser applications by default. I don't 
think we can but definitely appreciate hearing from other implementers.

If the claim is: "This thing has value even if only browsers do it", 
that simplifies the discussion a lot and helps us talk through the 
use-cases.

For example: I want non-browser clients to be able to do fully PQ TLS by 
default. I think that's a reasonable expectation.

If applications have to opt-in to use Trust Expressions through new APIs 
and Trust Expressions is necessary for PQ TLS, I feel we're landing in a 
pretty bad place on the PQ adoption story...

Best,
Dennis

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