Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management

Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> Sat, 01 December 2018 15:59 UTC

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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 1 Dec 2018 07:59:45 -0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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This does not seem to address a problem which was brought up when the
similar draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-00 was discussed, namely any
system in possession of one of the non-ephemeral-ECDHE private keys,
ostensibly for the purposes of passive traffic decryption, can arbitrarily
resume decrypted sessions and therefore impersonate any observed clients.

I'm not a fan of systems like this, but I believe for security reasons they
should be designed in such a way that only the confidentiality of traffic
is impacted, and a "visibility" system isn't able to leverage the decrypted
traffic to resume decrypted sessions and thereby impersonate clients.

-- 
Tony Arcieri