Re: [TLS] Does anyone still want dh_rsa and dh_dss?
Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Sun, 29 June 2014 20:55 UTC
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sun, 29 Jun 2014 13:54:17 -0700
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To: Michael StJohns <msj@nthpermutation.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Does anyone still want dh_rsa and dh_dss?
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On Sun, Jun 29, 2014 at 1:45 PM, Michael StJohns <msj@nthpermutation.com> wrote: > On 6/26/2014 12:14 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote: > > We've already removed static RSA for TLS 1.3 but we didn't > emove dh_rsa and dh_dss (as opposed to dhe_rsa and > dhe_dss). It seems like the arguments for removing static > RSA apply even more strongly here. > > Is there any reason to retain these in TLS 1.3? > > > Would it be more appropriate to ask this in a more crypto-neutral > manner? E.g. We've removed Public Key Transport as a valid mechanism for > pre-master setup. So instead maybe ask this as "Should we remove all > non-ephemeral key agreement mechanisms?" > > Or is there some reason to retain non-ephemeral ECDH vice non-ephemeral DH? > Not that I know of, it's just that I was working through the TLS spec and the ECDHE code points don't appear there, so I didn't think of it. -Ekr Mike > > > > -Ekr > > > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing listTLS@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > > > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > >
- [TLS] Does anyone still want dh_rsa and dh_dss? Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Does anyone still want dh_rsa and dh_ds… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Does anyone still want dh_rsa and dh_ds… Adam Langley
- Re: [TLS] Does anyone still want dh_rsa and dh_ds… Dan Brown
- Re: [TLS] Does anyone still want dh_rsa and dh_ds… Michael StJohns
- Re: [TLS] Does anyone still want dh_rsa and dh_ds… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Does anyone still want dh_rsa and dh_ds… Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Does anyone still want dh_rsa and dh_ds… Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Does anyone still want dh_rsa and dh_ds… Steve Checkoway
- Re: [TLS] Does anyone still want dh_rsa and dh_ds… Juho Vähä-Herttua