Re: [TLS] Draft RHRD

[Stephen Farrell <[e-mail]>]

On 01/11/17 14:18, Salz, Rich wrote:
> In https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24789.html,
> Nick Sullivan concluded:
> 
>> - on the other hand using draft-rhrd is safer than allowing
>> organizations to hack single-key escrow into TLS 1.3 or continue to
>> use TLS 1.2 with non-forward-secret cipher suites
> 
> I think this sets up a false comparison.  Existing TLS 1.3 debugging
> systems – Wireshark – can debug individual TLS sessions with the
> session key information being made available.  This is what the RHRD
> draft would require an organization to do, but it adds the additional
> signaling that the client is willing to allow it. The Wireshark
> example shows that the signaling is not needed.  Servers can
> unilaterally do it now.
> 
> I maintain that the cleartext signal servers no useful purpose,
> except to provide a mechanism for entities to segregate traffic.

I agree. I'd also like to point out that that in no
way implies that the absence of the visible signal
is any better. As we saw with draft-green, it was not.

S.

> 
> 
> 
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