Re: [TLS] A closer look at ROBOT, BB Attacks, timing attacks in general, and what we can do in TLS

Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> Fri, 15 December 2017 04:50 UTC

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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2017 06:50:50 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] A closer look at ROBOT, BB Attacks, timing attacks in general, and what we can do in TLS
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> On 15 Dec 2017, at 3:05, Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net>; wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 5:01 PM, Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de <mailto:hanno@hboeck.de>> wrote:
> On Thu, 14 Dec 2017 16:45:57 -0800
> Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net <mailto:colm@allcosts.net>> wrote:
> 
> > But what would that look like? What would we do now, in advance, to
> > make it easy to turn off AES? For example.
> 
> I think this is the wrong way to look at it.
> 
> >From what I'm aware nobody is really concerned about the security of
> AES. I don't think that there's any need to prepare for turning off AES.
> 
> Well, DJB is a notable concerned critic of AES and its safety in some respects ... but I was using AES as kind of a worst-case scenario since so many things do depend on it and it's especially hard to leave. I'm not aware of some ground-breaking cryptanalysis :) But I do think the question is worth having an answer for. I think we *do* need to prepare for turning off AES, there's always a chance we might have to.

I think that was the point of standardizing ChaCha20-Poly1305.  In fact, that’s what is says in the second paragraph of the introduction in RFC 7539:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7539#section-1 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7539#section-1>

Yoav