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Re: [TLS] Truncated HMAC: what to do with the MAC key?

Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> Sat, 08 July 2017 05:15 UTC

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From: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
To: tls@ietf.org
Date: Sat, 08 Jul 2017 01:15:17 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Truncated HMAC: what to do with the MAC key?
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On Saturday, July 08, 2017 12:38:18 am Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Andreas Walz <andreas.walz@hs-offenburg.de> writes:
> >different TLS implementations do not seem to agree on how to implement
> >truncated HMAC
> 
> It also says something about the status of this capability if three of the
> four known implementations can't interoperate.  If it's taken fourteen years
> (RFC 3546 was 2003) for someone to notice that the implementations don't
> work/interoperate then maybe the capability should be marked as deprecated or
> obsolete or unused or something.

In progress; the Truncated HMAC TLS extension is prohibited in implementations that support TLS 1.3+ as of the current draft.

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-21#page-127


Dave

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