Re: [TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8422 (5466)

Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> Fri, 17 August 2018 16:21 UTC

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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Date: Fri, 17 Aug 2018 12:21:49 -0400
Cc: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>, mpg@elzevir.fr, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Chris Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.com>, Joe Salowey <joe@salowey.net>, tls@ietf.org, Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
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References: <20180817020730.B5DF1B80117@rfc-editor.org> <CABkgnnWbfZwnEytt8FKhLxVjC9WZ5MMCT5MGAN9URm8LZcPP8A@mail.gmail.com> <1534487378.28819.2.camel@josefsson.org>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8422 (5466)
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I think we can safely mark this one HFDU (Hold For Document Update).

spt

> On Aug 17, 2018, at 02:29, Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>; wrote:
> 
> I would also remove the spurious paren instead -- having a MUST NOT
> inside a paren seems suboptimal to me.
> 
> /Simon
> 
> fre 2018-08-17 klockan 14:09 +1000 skrev Martin Thomson:
>> Looks good.  I would remove the trailing paren instead though.
>> On Fri, Aug 17, 2018 at 12:08 PM RFC Errata System
>> <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>; wrote:
>>> 
>>> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8422,
>>> "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport
>>> Layer Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier".
>>> 
>>> --------------------------------------
>>> You may review the report below and at:
>>> http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5466
>>> 
>>> --------------------------------------
>>> Type: Editorial
>>> Reported by: Masato Gosui <mgosui@yahoo-corp.jp>;
>>> 
>>> Section: 5.3
>>> 
>>> Original Text
>>> -------------
>>>    Actions of the sender:
>>> 
>>>    The server constructs an appropriate certificate chain and
>>> conveys it
>>>    to the client in the Certificate message.  If the client has
>>> used a
>>>    Supported Elliptic Curves Extension, the public key in the
>>> server's
>>>    certificate MUST respect the client's choice of elliptic
>>> curves.  A
>>>    server that cannot satisfy this requirement MUST NOT choose an
>>> ECC
>>>    cipher suite in its ServerHello message.)
>>> 
>>> Corrected Text
>>> --------------
>>>    Actions of the sender:
>>> 
>>>    The server constructs an appropriate certificate chain and
>>> conveys it
>>>    to the client in the Certificate message.  If the client has
>>> used a
>>>    Supported Elliptic Curves Extension, the public key in the
>>> server's
>>>    certificate MUST respect the client's choice of elliptic
>>> curves.  (A
>>>    server that cannot satisfy this requirement MUST NOT choose an
>>> ECC
>>>    cipher suite in its ServerHello message.)
>>> 
>>> Notes
>>> -----
>>> This adds the missing opening parenthesis of the last sentence of
>>> the "Actions of the sender" paragraph.
>>> 
>>> Instructions:
>>> -------------
>>> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary,
>>> please
>>> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
>>> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party
>>> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary.
>>> 
>>> --------------------------------------
>>> RFC8422 (draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17)
>>> --------------------------------------
>>> Title               : Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher
>>> Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier
>>> Publication Date    : August 2018
>>> Author(s)           : Y. Nir, S. Josefsson, M. Pegourie-Gonnard
>>> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
>>> Source              : Transport Layer Security
>>> Area                : Security
>>> Stream              : IETF
>>> Verifying Party     : IESG
>>> 
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> TLS mailing list
>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls