Re: [TLS] Questions about some expired drafts

Yuhong Bao <> Wed, 28 January 2015 01:22 UTC

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Subject: Re: [TLS] Questions about some expired drafts
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Yea, I believe the draft-rescorla-tls-extended-random is quite famous as a backdoor, 
along with Dual_EC_DRBG.

Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2015 21:32:51 +0100
Subject: Re: [TLS] Questions about some expired drafts

Hi *,

Salz, Rich wrote:
> OpenSSL includes at least the opaque-prf one. Any reason to keep the
> code? (I’m ripping out all sorts of old stuff now)
I see no value in keeping either of both drafts implemented.

* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00:
Section 4. pretty much states what any reader of the document will
conclude; implementing this document will probably cause more (fatal)
implementation errors rather than adding anything useful to TLS.
Furthermore it adds unnecessary complexity on both ends.

* draft-rescorla-tls-extended-random-02:
Same as above.

Also: BULLRUN/EDGEHILL explicitly mention subversion of standards by not
only the NSA but specifically one of the authors subdivisions. Don't
want to start tinfoil-hattery here but these IDs are rather useless, and
to be honest if US Gov. really /needs/ to use these extensions they
could go ahead and use them anyway without being a standard as they do
with other crypto primitives.


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