[TLS] Re: Working Group Last Call for Post-quantum Hybrid ECDHE-MLKEM Key Agreement for TLSv1.3

Jan Schaumann <jschauma@netmeister.org> Tue, 07 October 2025 18:05 UTC

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Date: Tue, 07 Oct 2025 14:05:37 -0400
From: Jan Schaumann <jschauma@netmeister.org>
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Subject: [TLS] Re: Working Group Last Call for Post-quantum Hybrid ECDHE-MLKEM Key Agreement for TLSv1.3
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Bas Westerbaan <bas=40cloudflare.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> This is the breakdown of client support Cloudflare sees (relative to any PQ
> support) in the last 24 hours by handshakes:
> 
> 94% X25519MLKEM768
> 8.1% X25519Kyber768
> 0.038% MLKEM768
> 0.014% CECPQ2
> 0.012% MLKEM1024
> 0.002% SecP384MLKEM1024
> 0.002% SecP256MLKEM768
> 0.00005% MLKEM512
> 0.0000003% SecP256Kyber768

[...]

> I can see an argument for Recommended=Y for both X25519MLKEM768 and
> SecP384MLKEM1024, but I do not see any value in recommending both
> X25519MLKEM768 and SecP256MLKEM768.

On the flip side, and as just some data points here, I
recently did a check[1] of which sites/providers offer
PQC, and what key groups they support.  Not
surprisingly, it's almost all (and _only_)
X25519MLKEM768.

Amazon Cloudfront (as pretty much the only large
service provider) offers SecP256r1MLKEM768.

This is not surprising: AFAICT, the browsers only
support X25519MLKEM768.  If no servers offer anything
else, then browsers have no incentive to implement
other key groups; if no browsers offer other
keygroups, then servers have no incentive to offer
them.

-Jan

[1] https://www.netmeister.org/blog/pqc-use-2025-09.html