Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 + PSK with multiple identities

["Andreas Walz" <[e-mail]>]

Hi Olivier,

your findings are interesting as they pretty much match with what we
have found when studying TLS implementations for embedded systems. In
many implementations there is a tendency to ignore redundant length
fields (or at least to not enforce consistency). There has been some
discussion about this on the list, see thread "Suspicious behaviour of
TLS server implementations".

We are currently refining our study and in the process of writing a
paper. I hopefully can give more details on results soon.

Cheers,
Andi 

___________________________________

Andreas Walz
Research Engineer
Institute of reliable Embedded Systems and Communication Electronics
(ivESK)
Offenburg University of Applied Sciences, 77652 Offenburg, Germany


>>> Olivier Levillain <[e-mail]> 10/04/16 5:51 AM
>>>
Hi list,

I have been working in the labs at ANSSI (the French Network and
Information System Agency) for several years and I just defended my PhD
thesis on the TLS ecosystem (documents are available at
http://paperstreet.picty.org/~yeye/2016/phdthesis-Levillain16/).

>> On Mon, 2016-09-19 at 10:29 +0200, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:
>>> On Mon, 2016-08-08 at 11:28 +0300, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
>>>> More compact and makes the option where server sends some bad
option
>>>> more clear.
>> Note that if we really want to be more compact, we might also observe
>> that there is a redundant length field in the extension as sent by
the
>> client:
>>            case client_hello:
>>                PskIdentity identities<6..2^16-1>;
>>
>> Each extension has at least four bytes on the wire — the
extension_type
>> itself, and the length field of the extension_data in a uint16.
>>
>> If I am interpreting the spec correctly, then the data for the
>> PreSharedKeyIdentity extension in the ClientHello then follows that
>> with another uint16, which is *always* a value two lower than the one
>> which immediately precedes it.
>>
>> e.g.
>>
>>   0x00 0x29      // ExtensionType extension_type == 41
>>   0x00 0x14      // opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>
>>     // This length field is entirely redundant:
>>     0x00 0x12      // PskIdentity identities<6..2^16-1>
>>                      // First identity:
>>       0x00 0x00      // PskKeyExchangeMode, PskAuthenticationMode
>>       0x00 0x04      // opaque identity<0..2^16-1>
>>         0x44 0x61 0x76 0x65 // "Dave"
>>                      // Second identity:
>>       0x00 0x00      // PskKeyExchangeMode, PskAuthenticationMode
>>       0x00 0x06      // opaque identity<0..2^16-1)>
>>         0x43 0x68 0x6c 0x6f 0xc3 0xab // "Chloë"
>>
>> Do we care that the '0x00 0x12' bytes on my third line above are
>> entirely redundant on the wire? Or have I interpreted it wrong?
>>
> Not enough to fix it, this is just the way TLS rolls.

Sorry if I am a little late to the party, but I noticed that even if
this is generally true, I believe it has not always been enforced in TLS
extensions.

In 2006, the IETF standardised the session tickets extension, allowing
for session resumption without server-side state (RFC 4507).
However, no TLS stack implements the specification correctly: even
if the specification described the _content_ of the extension as
a variable-length object (that is an opaque object prefixed by its
length), every implementation ignores this second (useless) length
field.  The RFC 5077, published in 2008, fixes the gap
between the specification and the implementations.

RFC 4507 :

The SessionTicket extension has been assigned
the number 35.  The format of the SessionTicket
extension is given at the end of this section.

  struct {
    opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>;
  } SessionTicket;

00 23          Ticket Extension type 35
01 02          Length of extension contents
01 00          Length of ticket
FF FF .. ..    Actual ticket

RFC 5077

The SessionTicket extension has been assigned
the number 35.  The extension_data field of
SessionTicket extension contains the ticket.

00 23FF FF .. ..    Actual ticket


Best regards,
olivier

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