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Re: [TLS] Security review of TLS1.3 0-RTT

Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> Tue, 02 May 2017 17:55 UTC

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From: Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net>
Date: Tue, 02 May 2017 10:52:29 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Security review of TLS1.3 0-RTT
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On Tue, May 2, 2017 at 10:33 AM, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
wrote:
>
> I believe that the proposed change is well intentioned but
> counter-productive.
>

Note that the recommendation in the review is:

 'TLS1.3 should require that TLS implementions handling 0-RTT "MUST"
provide a mechanism to prevent duplicate tickets from being used for 0-RTT
data'

it is not quite about the general use of tickets - only as they pertain to
0-RTT data.  My understanding is that 0-RTT is not particularly interesting
for SMTP, so would that be ok?


-- 
Colm

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