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Re: [TLS] datacenter TLS decryption as a three-party protocol

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Wed, 19 July 2017 22:50 UTC

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To: Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net>, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] datacenter TLS decryption as a three-party protocol
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On 19/07/17 18:45, Colm MacCárthaigh wrote:
> For example, browser's
> incognito modes may refuse to support such sessions, if they knew what was
> going on.

That is a perfect example of the hideous dangers of all of this.
The implication in the above is that browsers would/should turn
on wiretapping support in the normal case.

S.

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