[TLS] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-tls-esni-23

Adam Montville via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Wed, 05 March 2025 20:45 UTC

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From: Adam Montville via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org>
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Date: Wed, 05 Mar 2025 12:45:44 -0800
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CC: draft-ietf-tls-esni.all@ietf.org, last-call@ietf.org, tls@ietf.org
Reply-To: Adam Montville <adam@onepenny.group>
Subject: [TLS] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-tls-esni-23
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/76mM1TNkNTLxO0n63tzOI94pHxY>

Reviewer: Adam Montville
Review result: Ready

Based on my review of this draft I would classify it as "ready" for
publication, with some minor caveats that don’t fundamentally undermine its
readiness.The draft defines a clear, well-specified mechanism for encrypting
the ClientHello. It leverages established cryptographic primitives and
preserves existing TLS 1.3 security properties. The threat model is thoroughly
addressed with a formal analysis documented in a reference.

If it is possible (possibly not in this drat) to offer more detailed
operational guidance on key rotation, that would be helpful. There are some
points in the document that might allude to implementation-specific
configuration choices. Implementations would ideally expose these choices to
operators so they can make the best possible choices for their needs.

[TLS] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-tls-e… Adam Montville via Datatracker
[TLS] Re: Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-t… Eric Rescorla