Re: [TLS] HSM-friendly Key Computation

[Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]>]

On Thu, Apr 23, 2015 at 1:03 PM, Michael StJohns <[e-mail]>
wrote:

>  On 4/22/2015 7:03 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 22, 2015 at 5:30 PM, Michael StJohns <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
>>  On 4/22/2015 1:37 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>>
>> If we're using HKDF-Extract, can we just key off different labels?
>>
>>  -Ekr
>>
>>
>  Sorry, read that as "HKD-Expand".
>
> Actually, use HKDF as the term with no expand or extract suffix.
>

I discussed this extensively with Hugo and Hoeteck and their advice was to
use
them separately in a similar way to what's here (though they suggested a
slightly
different hierarchy which I have to edit in). Perhaps Hugo will weigh in as
to
the reasoning.

-Ekr


> Mike
>
>
>
>
>
>  -Ekr
>
>
>>  Basically, no.
>>
>> The Extract function is really not designed to be used standalone but as
>> a way of concentrating entropy for input to the expansion phase.  Its
>> dangerous to talk of these functions as separately callable.  They are
>> steps not separate functions.
>>
>>  The extract step's only non-key input - salt - is not the same as the
>> "info" input used in the expand phase - 'salt' is supposed to be missing or
>> random,  not a fixed string like a label.
>>
>> "info" is where the various labels go and that's only present in the
>> expand phase.
>>
>>
>> What you want to do is specify as part of the mixins (e.g. 'info' - e.g.
>> the collection of label and context)  a set of fields that describe 1) how
>> the key stream is going to be broken up (eg. lengths of the sub keys), 2)
>> what algorithms will use each of the parts of the key stream, and 3)
>> whether or not those parts are allowed to be exported/extracted.
>>
>> A software module will basically ignore these because - really - its all
>> the same memory although it should really make sure the key lengths and
>> types matc.  An HSM will look at these and be able to make policy decisions
>> for protection of the segments (e.g. preventing export of material that was
>> created to be non-exportable).
>>
>> Having all of these in the mixins means that the key stream expansion
>> completely changes if ANY of these mixins change which in turn means  that
>> the various ways you can use to extract truly secret key material (as
>> differentiated from exportable material) from an HSM using the currently
>> defined mechanism can be eliminated.  (I can explain my reasoning if
>> necessary).
>>
>>
>> Mike
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 22, 2015 at 1:35 PM, Ilari Liusvaara <
>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Apr 22, 2015 at 10:02:50AM -0700, Robert Relyea wrote:
>>> > On 04/20/2015 09:37 AM, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
>>> > >
>>> > >There are other places in TLS that fundamentally need to (indirectly)
>>> derive
>>> > >public data out of secret key material.
>>> > That's not a a problem. The problem is using the same mechanism to
>>> derive
>>> > the public data that we use to derive the keys.
>>> > It's even OK to use the same secret key for both (from an HSM POV).
>>> >
>>> > What Michael is saying is that there are existing functions for both
>>> KDF
>>> > (secret material -> key) and Mac (secret material-> unique public
>>> data).
>>> > He's requesting that TLS not have it's own versions of these functions.
>>>
>>> So would using two different PRF functions, one for parts that don't
>>> downgrade and another for parts that do downgrade (e.g. IV derivation,
>>> unique / finished calculations, exporter calculations, etc..) solve the
>>> issue?
>>>
>>> (Of course, the two functions should be closely related, so not to
>>> annoy software implementations too much)...
>>>
>>>
>>> -Ilari
>>>
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>>
>>
>>
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