Re: [TLS] Data volume limits

"Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu> Mon, 28 December 2015 20:51 UTC

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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Data volume limits
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Date: Mon, 28 Dec 2015 20:51:01 +0000
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Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Data volume limits
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When too much plaintext has been encrypted with the same key, the key needs to be changed. When the key is changed, the change procedure should involve new randomness. 

What's the confusion here???

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Verizon Wireless 4G LTE network.
From: Eric Rescorla
Sent: Monday, December 28, 2015 15:47
To: Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
Cc: Florian Weimer; tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Data volume limits

To be clear, the concern that we are trying to alleviate is encrypting too much plaintext with the
same key (see the discussion by Watson at the beginning of this thread). For that purpose,
I'm not following why we need to introduce new randomness (draft-11 doesn't do so,
but just cranks the KDF forward).

It's possible I've misunderstood something, though, so happy to be corrected.

-Ekr



On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 3:40 PM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
Off-hand, key update or re-key without new/fresh‎ randomness sounds weird.

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Verizon Wireless 4G LTE network.
From: Eric Rescorla
Sent: Monday, December 28, 2015 15:37
To: Florian Weimer
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Data volume limits



On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 3:33 PM, Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> wrote:
On 12/28/2015 09:11 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:

>> You still have the added complexity that during rekey, you need to
>> temporarily switch from mere sending or receiving to at least
>> half-duplex interaction.
>>
>
> That's not intended. Indeed, you need to be able to handle the old key
> in order to send/receive the KeyUpdate. Can you elaborate on your concern?

Ah, so you want to keep the current mechanism and not inject fresh
randomness?  Isn't this fairly risky?

Can you explain the risk you are concerned about in more detail?

-Ekr