[TLS] PR#962:CertificateRequest in post-handhake phase
Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Tue, 18 April 2017 13:49 UTC
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2017 09:48:33 -0400
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Subject: [TLS] PR#962:CertificateRequest in post-handhake phase
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https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/962 Target merge date: Thursday In reviewing the specification, I noticed that we seem to have banned the use of CertificateRequest with PSK both in the main handshake and in the post-handshake phase. I don't believe that this was intentional and it makes it very hard to use client auth with resumption. Accordingly I have filed the above PR to remove that restriction (while retaining it for the main handshake). As I understand it, several of the analyses we have already assumed this case and covered it, so no additional work is needed there. Comments/Objections welcome. -Ekr
- [TLS] PR#962:CertificateRequest in post-handhake … Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] PR#962:CertificateRequest in post-handh… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] PR#962:CertificateRequest in post-handh… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] PR#962:CertificateRequest in post-handh… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] PR#962:CertificateRequest in post-handh… Ilari Liusvaara