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Re: [TLS] [FORGED] Re: no fallbacks please [was: Downgrade protection, fallbacks, and server time]

Kyle Rose <krose@krose.org> Tue, 07 June 2016 14:22 UTC

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References: <CAF8qwaDuGyHOu_4kpWN+c+vJKXyERPJu-2xR+nu=sPzG5vZ+ag@mail.gmail.com> <201606031616.14451.davemgarrett@gmail.com> <1612869.mrh4f7qht5@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <201606061453.53336.davemgarrett@gmail.com> <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C73F4C9D3F0@uxcn10-5.UoA.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Tue, 07 Jun 2016 10:22:20 -0400
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From: Kyle Rose <krose@krose.org>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [FORGED] Re: no fallbacks please [was: Downgrade protection, fallbacks, and server time]
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I'm a big fan of the idea of a very strict qualification suite, as well, to
try to head off some of these problems before (faulty) implementations
proliferate.

Hackathon?

Kyle
On Jun 7, 2016 2:00 AM, "Peter Gutmann" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote:

> Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> writes:
>
> >Also, as with any new system, we now have the ability to loudly stress to
> TLS
> >1.3+ implementers to not screw it up and test for future-proofing this
> time
> >around.
>
> I think that's the main contribution of a new mechanism, it doesn't really
> matter whether it's communicated as a single value, a list, or interpretive
> dance, the main thing is that there needs to be a single location where the
> version is given (not multiple locations that can disagree with each other
> as
> for TLS < 1.3), and the spec should include a pseudocode algorithm for
> dealing
> with the version data rather than just "implementations should accept
> things
> that look about right".
>
> Peter.
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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