Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibility from TLS 1.3 draft
mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex) Mon, 29 December 2014 19:27 UTC
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To: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Dec 2014 20:26:57 +0100
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From: mrex@sap.com
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Subject: Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibility from TLS 1.3 draft
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Dave Garrett wrote: > Martin Rex wrote: >> JDK 1.6 might be past its "End of Public Updates", but it is still >> fully supported and pretty omnipresent, in particular in company >> environments and the majority of server-side (J2EE) installations. > > Server-side usage would not be affected by the proposed changes. Server-side usage will be significantly adversely affected by a silly MUST NOT accept TLSv1.2 offered in SSL Version 2.0 CLIENT-HELLO > > Server and client usage in company environments are where it is easiest > to deal with the proposed changes. The clients' settings just need to be > changed to stop using SSL entirely and send only v3 hellos. The Server's setting will have to be changed to modify the client connections originating from a J2EE server that is using Java 6. > > I'll restate again, this is already the consensus. > (again, assuming no surprises with the SSL3 I-D) > > http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6176 You might be misreading that document: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6176#section-3 o TLS servers MAY continue to accept ClientHello messages in the version 2 CLIENT-HELLO format as specified in RFC 5246 [TLS1.2], Appendix E.2. A SSL Version 2.0 CLIENT-HELLO offering TLSv1.2 is perfectly sufficient to negotiate the mandatory-to-implement TLSv1.2 TLS cipher suite: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-9 > > "TLS clients MUST NOT send the SSL version 2.0 compatible CLIENT- > HELLO message format" This applies only to *NEW* clients. This does not affect the behaviour of the installed base at all. The Server-side needs to address the behaviour of the installed base for the purpose of interop. > > With both SSL2 & SSL3 prohibited, there should be no v2 hellos. But there still are plenty of them around in the installed base. > > Put bluntly, any environment that actually HAS v2 hellos is already > ignoring IETF RFCs. Behaviour of the installed base is well known to be unaffected by documents published by the IETF (or any other organization, or government). -Martin
- [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibility… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Brian Smith
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Yuhong Bao
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Dave Garrett
- [TLS] explicitly specify ClientHello record versi… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Kurt Roeckx
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Jeffrey Walton
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Kurt Roeckx
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Hauke Mehrtens
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Fabrice
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Brian Smith
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Brian Smith
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Brian Smith
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Kurt Roeckx
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Hauke Mehrtens
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Kurt Roeckx
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Brian Smith
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Yuhong Bao
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Florian Weimer
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Florian Weimer
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Yuhong Bao
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Andrei Popov
- [TLS] Downgrade Dance steps (Re: drop obsolete SS… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Downgrade Dance steps (Re: drop obsolet… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Yuhong Bao
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibi… Yuhong Bao