Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fallback alerts (was: Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-01.txt)
mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex) Tue, 11 November 2014 19:42 UTC
Return-Path: <mrex@sap.com>
X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A15211A88C3 for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 11 Nov 2014 11:42:03 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.551
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.551 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HELO_EQ_DE=0.35, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id llrauikps9DA for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 11 Nov 2014 11:42:02 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpde02.smtp.sap-ag.de (smtpde02.smtp.sap-ag.de [155.56.68.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CB7B81A883B for <tls@ietf.org>; Tue, 11 Nov 2014 11:42:01 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail05.wdf.sap.corp (mail05.sap.corp [194.39.131.55]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtpde02.smtp.sap-ag.de (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C6C343A209; Tue, 11 Nov 2014 20:41:59 +0100 (CET)
Received: from ld9781.wdf.sap.corp (ld9781.wdf.sap.corp [10.21.82.193]) by mail05.wdf.sap.corp (Postfix) with ESMTP id B8D3441A04; Tue, 11 Nov 2014 20:41:59 +0100 (CET)
Received: by ld9781.wdf.sap.corp (Postfix, from userid 10159) id B1EC81AFBA; Tue, 11 Nov 2014 20:41:59 +0100 (CET)
In-Reply-To: <CABkgnnVoKXj3RMounDFPdOKe+48u1S0-9TTfVMqRN3U0jERRbg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Nov 2014 20:41:59 +0100
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4ME+ PL125 (25)]
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Message-Id: <20141111194159.B1EC81AFBA@ld9781.wdf.sap.corp>
From: mrex@sap.com
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/8C12aRGV5890Ym0oKebhYhPvVZU
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fallback alerts (was: Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-01.txt)
X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
Reply-To: mrex@sap.com
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 11 Nov 2014 19:42:03 -0000
Martin Thomson wrote: > On 11 November 2014 07:52, Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> wrote: > > The record layer version number MUST be set to ClientHello.cipher_suites for > > this alert (as it would for the Server Hello message if the server was > > continuing the handshake). > > I think that you mean ClientHello.client_version for the record layer. ClientHello.cipher_suites as written by Bodo and echoed by Florian does not make any sense to me (not only because a list of integers can not possibly fit into a single integer. But I do _not_ think that a MUST for ClientHello.client_version would be appropriate for an fatal alert that is sent instead of ServerHello. For alerts that early in the handshake a server may for simplicity reuse the record layer protocol that was used for the in coming ClientHello. -Martin
- [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-0… internet-drafts
- [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fallback… Florian Weimer
- Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fall… Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fall… Florian Weimer
- Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fall… Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fall… Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fall… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fall… Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fall… Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fall… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fall… Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fall… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fall… Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fall… Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fall… Florian Weimer
- Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fall… Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fall… Florian Weimer
- Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fall… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fall… Ben Laurie
- Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fall… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fall… Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fall… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fall… Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Protocol version for inappropriate_fall… Martin Rex